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A PROPERTY LAW INSTRUCTOR LOOKS AT THE CONTRACT 
LAW COURSE 
PETER W. SALSICH, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
My colleagues at Saint Louis University School of Law may wonder why I 
have ventured to write a commentary on teaching contract law.  They know me 
as a professor of property law, a course I have taught for about twenty-five 
years.  But I began my career in teaching with Contracts in 1969 and taught it 
during my first three years.  I have also taught the first semester of Contracts 
from time to time over the years in our summer institute for persons from 
minority and disadvantaged backgrounds.  I am returning to teaching Contracts 
to fill in for two colleagues who are on sabbatical.  Whether I will stay in 
Contracts or return to Property remains to be seen.  However, I presume to try 
my hands at this commentary because I believe there are great similarities 
between the two courses, particularly in the opportunities the two courses offer 
to explore non-adversarial dispute resolution techniques, as well as ethics and 
professional responsibility issues confronted daily by transactional lawyers. 
Virtually everyone coming to law school has some experience with 
contract and property law.  Apartment leases, contracts to purchase homes and 
automobiles, employment contracts, credit card transactions and bank loans are 
just a few examples where contract and property law may be experienced by 
people in their everyday lives.  But the law has its own terminology, and the 
rules of law do not always track lay peoples’ expectations when they engage in 
what to them are routine transactions.  Thus, the first-year law student often is 
surprised when he or she confronts the concepts of caveat emptor, contracts of 
adhesion, equitable servitudes, the parol evidence rule and other classic 
contract and property law doctrines. 
To me the most exciting aspects of contract law are the concept of 
promises and the question of the extent the law should inject itself into private 
relationships founded on the moral underpinnings of promises.  While many 
 
* McDonnell Professor of Justice, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Many thanks are due 
my colleagues, Susan FitzGibbon, Joel Goldstein and Vincent Immel, for their encouragement, 
and Jeremy Johnson, 2L, for his suggestions drawn from his experience in the contracts law 
course. 
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contracts law professors begin their courses with a discussion of the range of 
remedies available for a breach of contract, I begin with a discussion of 
promises.  I learned contracts that way as a law student, and I began my 
teaching career with that emphasis because, like most of us, I started with the 
contract law that I had learned in law school.  While one group of contracts 
professors begins with remedies and another group begins with promises, most 
of us wind up covering the same topics: contract formation, voluntary vs. 
involuntary promises, consideration, the parol evidence rule, the Statute of 
Frauds, conditions, performance and breach, remedies, and relationships with 
third parties.  In this essay, I discuss my reasons for beginning with promises 
and my belief that students can and should be exposed to alternative dispute 
resolution techniques, as well as ethics and professional responsibility issues, 
within the context of traditional first-year contract and property law courses. 
A. Promises v. Remedies 
In returning to teaching the contracts course, I looked at the alternative 
approach that emphasizes remedies.  A number of instructors begin with the 
famous “hairy hand” case, Hawkins v. McGee.1  This case takes an egregious 
set of facts about a surgery gone terribly wrong and uses it to explore the range 
of remedies available in a contract case—as distinguished from a tort case.2  
 
 1. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
 2. My former colleague, Chris Frost, Brown Todd and Heyburn Professor of Law, 
University of Kentucky College of Law, has contributed a very persuasive argument to this 
symposium for the remedies approach, including a fascinating discussion of how he uses the 
Hawkins case. Christopher W. Frost, Reconsidering the Reliance Interest, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1361 (2000). 
  Professor Daniel J. Bussel, co-author of one of the leading Contracts casebooks, 
ARTHUR ROSETT & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION, (6th ed. 1999), 
offers the following rationale: 
  The remedies materials put front and center the economic efficiency and wealth 
maximization objectives that are central to contract law viewed as a means of organizing 
economic activity and facilitating commercial exchange.  Starting with remedies also 
focuses students on the practical limitations to the relief afforded injured parties through 
litigation, and the liquidated damages and arbitration materials can be used effectively to 
introduce the student to the planning perspective early on.  Finally, the connection 
between contract interpretation and the expectancy interest drives home in a practical way 
the importance of determining the objective meaning of the parties’ agreement.  This 
latter point can be made with the consideration and related materials as well, but perhaps 
more aridly and theoretically. 
  To deal with student complaints that it is perverse to start at the “end,” i.e. with 
remedies, rather than say offer and acceptance, I point out the seamless web quality of the 
law and that one needs to cover all the material and see it as part of an integrated whole in 
any event.  You can climb up the mountain, ending up with remedies, or start at the top of 
the mountain and ski down.  Either way you have to explore the terrain from top to 
bottom. 
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But the more I thought about it, the more I concluded that I would have great 
difficulty in presenting to incoming students a contracts rationale that focuses 
initially on the back end of a transaction: after it has gone sour.  Instead, I 
begin the course at the front end of the transaction, focusing on the question of 
what is a promise.3  I use a set of old cases,4 including Snell v. Kresge Co.,5 
Laux v. Bekins Van and Storage Co.,6 Silverman v. Imperial London Hotels, 
Ltd.,7 Foley v. Classique Coaches, Ltd,8 and Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon9 
to explore the concepts of a promise and a contract as a legally enforceable 
promise. 
Section 2(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a promise as 
“a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so 
made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been 
made.”10  I use these introductory cases to explore when what one person does 
justifies a second person to understand that the first person has made a 
commitment.  From there I move to the definition of a contract: “a promise or 
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”11  Rather 
than examining the rules to determine what type of remedy should be granted 
or when performance should be ordered, these cases enable me to pose the 
question to students of why a court gets involved in relationships created by 
private communications between or among individuals and groups.  At bottom, 
the answer appears to be because people need an environment of stability with 
respect to their business transactions and personal relationships if society is to 
progress in a democratic manner. 
Thomas Friedman, in his superb discussion of globalization, The Lexus 
and the Olive Tree,12 argues that one of the essential elements of success for a 
developing country is a stable legal system, so people will have confidence that 
if they make an effort to produce new things, invest in new ideas or strive for 
personal growth, their commitments—whether financial, physical or 
emotional—will be honored by the people who have made commitments in 
return.  Friedman, using a computer analogy, characterizes the rule of law as a 
country’s “software” that enables its economic system, or “hardware,” and 
 
Letter from Daniel J. Bussel to the author (October 5, 2000) (on file with author). 
 3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981). 
 4. Don’t we all start with old cases? 
 5. 263 N.W. 493 (Iowa 1937). 
 6. 169 P. 1012 (Cal. 1917). 
 7. 137 L.T.R. 57 (K.B. 1927). 
 8. 2 K.B. 1 (C.A. 1934). 
 9. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981). 
 11. Id. § 1. 
 12. THOMAS J. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (2000). 
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macroeconomic policies, or “operating system,” to function properly.  
Friedman states: “Software is a measure of the quality of a country’s legal and 
regulatory systems, and the degree to which its officials, bureaucrats and 
citizens understand its laws, embrace them and know how to make them 
work.”13  Whether commitments are made by people in local, national or 
international settings, the rules of contract law play a crucial role in 
establishing an environment of stability.  Students must have a sense of the 
role contract law plays in establishing this environment in order to better 
appreciate the use of the range of possible remedies when the rules are 
violated. 
In addition to the economics rationale for enforcing contracts, the notion of 
justice plays an important role in the enforcement decision.  John Rawls argues 
persuasively that the concept of justice as fairness is an essential element of a 
free society.14  Decisions to enforce promises flow from the moral principle of 
fairness.  A promise voluntarily made in “circumstances . . . and [with] 
excusing conditions . . . defined so as to preserve the equal liberty of the 
parties and to make the practice a rational means [for entering into and 
stabilizing] cooperative agreements for mutual advantages” becomes a moral 
duty under the principle of fairness.  “The obligations to keep a promise is a 
consequence of the principle of fairness.”15 
The initial focus on promises also is a useful way of emphasizing the 
importance of careful reading of cases and careful drafting of legal documents.  
The essence of the promise or promises at stake in a legal relationship may not 
always be revealed clearly by the parties in their words and deeds, or by the 
authors of the judicial opinions students study.  Students need to be able to 
extract the promise at issue in order to apply effectively the rules for 
determining whether the promise should be enforced as a contract.  
Consequently, I spend a lot of time, particularly in the early part of the 
contracts course, engaging students in discussions about promises. 
B. Adding Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques 
During my years as a property law professor, I attempted to integrate into 
the course, and into a casebook I co-authored,16 a discussion of alternative 
dispute resolution techniques, along with ethics and professional responsibility 
issues.  In reflecting on that effort, I believe that one of the reasons the 
property law course is so amenable to such materials is that so much of it 
involves promissory relationships among private individuals who wish to 
 
 13. Id. at 151-52. 
 14. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-53 (1971). 
 15. Id. at 344-46. 
 16. SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MICHAEL 
BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW (2d ed. 1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] A PROPERTY LAW INSTRUCTOR LOOKS AT THE CONTRACT LAW COURSE 1219 
maintain their relationship while resolving a dispute.  For example, estate 
planning transactions, landlord/tenant relationships, real estate contracts, and 
private covenants respecting land use all involve relationships founded on 
some type of promise. 
1. Estate Planning Transactions 
One of my favorite cases for raising questions of alternative dispute 
resolution and lawyers’ professional responsibility is Pigg v. Haley.17  In this 
case, the Virginia Supreme Court was asked to rule on the validity of an 
agreement that had been executed to resolve uncertainties triggered by a will.  
The Haleys were married for forty years.  During that time they purchased and 
managed a 152-acre farm.  In addition, Mr. Haley, the decedent, maintained a 
close personal relationship with his fourth cousin, Garland Pigg, who was 
discovered by Mr. Haley in the 1940s when he was doing a genealogical study.  
Because the Haleys had no children, Mr. Haley took in Garland Pigg and 
treated him as if he was his own son.  The controversy began when Mr. Haley 
died and a holographic will was discovered in his genealogical papers.  To the 
great surprise of his surviving spouse, Eva Haley, the will included Garland 
Pigg as a beneficiary.  Instead of leaving all his property to his wife, Mr. Haley 
left his land to his wife only for the duration of her life.  Upon her death all real 
and personal property, which “she has not consumed or disposed of,” was to 
become the property of Garland Pigg as a beneficiary.18 
Following the probating of the will, an attorney told the widow that she 
had only a life estate in her husband’s estate.  He told her: “You own nothing; 
you have the use of the property, the use of the farm; the proceeds of the farm 
until you die; and you have the interest from the money until you die.”19  Mrs. 
Haley and the Piggs then consulted a bookkeeping tax service proprietor, who 
told Mrs. Haley that she “will receive the interest from the money and the 
proceeds from the farm.”  He recommended she consult another lawyer.20  The 
second lawyer recommended asking a court to construe the will.  When Mrs. 
Haley objected to going to court, the lawyer drafted a short agreement in 
consultation with Mrs. Haley and Garland Pigg, which specified that: (1) all 
personal property was to go to Eva Haley with the complete right to dispose of 
it; and (2) all real estate went to Eva Haley for life “with the remainder over to 
Garland D. Pigg, upon her death, in fee simple and absolutely.”21  About 
twenty months later, Mrs. Haley signed a real estate contract to sell thirty acres 
of the 152-acre farm to some relatives.  The widow and the relatives then filed 
 
 17. 294 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1982). 
 18. Id. at 853-55. 
 19. Id. at 855. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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suit against Mr. Pigg for construction of the Haley-Pigg agreement, claiming 
that they had an equitable fee interest in the thirty acres.22 
Pigg v. Haley is a beautiful intersection of property and contract law.  In 
the property law course, I use the case to focus on the concept of a life estate 
and its limitations.  The life estate is an ownership interest for an indefinite 
period of time.  Within the common law system of estates in land, which is 
based on the concept of ownership spread over a plane of time, the life estate is 
a very limited estate because no one knows when someone will die; it could be 
in 100 years or it could be five minutes from now. 
With respect to contract law, the fundamental issue in the case was the 
validity of the agreement between Eva Haley and Garland Pigg.  To answer 
that question, the required contractual element of consideration had to be 
identified.  But to evaluate the purported consideration, the will had to be 
evaluated to determine what property interests had been transferred.  In 
addition, the court had to consider whether the promises exchanged were not 
voluntary because of a mutual mistake of material fact.23  The Virginia 
Supreme Court approached the problem by first examining the property 
interests conveyed by Edward Haley’s will.  In construing two provisions of 
the Virginia Code24 and applying them to the case, the court held that Garland 
Pigg had received the equivalent of a contingent remainder in the personal 
property.  Since Pigg’s decision to give up his contingent interest in the 
personal property in return for a vested remainder in the realty was a sufficient 
legal detriment, it constituted consideration to support the agreement.  The 
court also held that the mutual mistake rule had no application to agreements 
designed to compromise and settle disputes.25 
The case also is very useful for introducing students to alternative dispute 
resolution techniques.26  I recall attending a conference on dispute resolution 
several years ago in which one of the speakers suggested that, for the world 
outside the sphere of influence of Anglo-American law, litigation was the 
alternative rather than the predominate technique.  In the Pigg case, a lawyer 
attempted unsuccessfully to mediate and help Eva Haley and Garland Pigg 
negotiate an agreement settling a growing dispute between them.  In recreating 
 
 22. Pigg, 294 S.E.2d at 854-55. 
 23. Id. at 853, 859. 
 24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7 (Michie 1950) (validating remainder interests when life 
tenants also receive the power to dispose); Id. § 55-11 (presuming that the grantor conveys all 
property owned unless the contrary intent is evidenced). 
 25. Pigg, 294 S.E.2d  at 858-59. 
 26. The term, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was coined to distinguish arbitration, 
conciliation, mediation and other private dispute resolution techniques from litigation, the 
predominant public one.  Advocates of ADR now refer to it as “appropriate dispute resolution.”  
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and 
Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 802 (1999). 
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the scene from the opinion, it appears that the agreement triggering the 
litigation was dictated by the attorney following suggestions from the widow 
about the contract terms.  The attorney dictated the language to his secretary, in 
the presence of the widow and the Piggs.  After the secretary typed the 
document and brought it back in, the attorney asked the parties whether they 
understood the document and whether “these were the terms [they] wanted.”27  
According to the case report, the widow responded “yes,” and Mr. Pigg stated, 
“[i]f that’s what she wants, that’s okay with me.”28 
The case also illustrates the lawyer’s professional responsibility to identify 
and be loyal to his or her client while also serving the public.  In this case the 
questions whether or not the lawyer accurately determined which of the two 
persons in his office was his client and whether the lawyer was able, in the 
context of this tense family situation, to provide adequate professional services 
to both of them are presented.  The property casebook I co-authored includes, 
in the notes after Pigg, section 3-912 of the Uniform Probate Code, which 
provides: “[S]uccessors may agree among themselves to alter the interest, 
shares, or amounts to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent . . . 
in any way that they provide in a written contract.”29  The notes also include 
Rule 2.2 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct identifying “the lawyer as intermediary” function and setting down 
the requirements for acting in that role.  Rule 2.2 requires lawyers serving as 
mediators to make certain that all parties understand the process and consent to 
the mediation process.  The lawyer also must make an informed judgment that 
the common and individual interests of the parties will be served by the lawyer 
acting as a mediator.  Finally, the lawyer must conclude after reflection that he 
or she is able to do the job.30 
In examining those provisions and applying them to the Haley case, I use 
the casebook notes to ask the students whether the attorney ever got to the 
source of Mrs. Haley’s unhappiness.  Did the formal setting of the law office, 
with the lawyer dictating to his secretary, in front of Mrs. Haley and Mr. Pigg, 
a document full of legal terminology intimidate Mrs. Haley into saying yes?  
Was the heart of this controversy Mrs. Haley’s disappointment that Mr. Haley 
had not consulted her before drafting his will, and apparently did not have 
confidence in her ability to manage the farm and did not trust her to provide for 
Mr. Pigg?  Did the lawyer focus simply on the legal problem the parties 
brought to him?  Should he have been more sensitive to the complex family 
dynamics underneath the dispute?  Pigg v. Haley  provides a wonderful 
 
 27. Pigg, 294 S.E.2d at 856. 
 28. Id. 
 29. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (amended 1993). 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 2.2 (1984). 
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opportunity to explore these issues of dispute resolution and professionalism in 
both courses. 
2. Landlord-Tenant Lease Transactions 
Another area of intersection between property and contract law is landlord-
tenant law.  Leases are both contracts and conveyances of the property.  
Students often have difficulty when they first encounter the dual concepts of a 
lease.  Leases can be used to teach the non-freehold estates in land concept of 
property ownership.  They can also be used to teach the transactional aspect 
and contractual nature of the relationship.  Landlords and tenants exchange 
promises.  Many of the changes in landlord-tenant law over the last thirty years 
revolve around interpretation of the commitments that the two parties make in 
that exchange.31 
In the famous implied warranty of habitability case, Javins v. First 
National Realty Corp.,32 Judge J. Skelly Wright spent a considerable amount 
of time exploring the contractual relationship of landlord and tenant.  He noted 
that under modern contract law, “the buyer of goods and services in an 
industrialized society must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier to 
assure the goods and services purchased are of adequate quality.”33  He also 
introduced the notion that urban residential landlords and tenants essentially 
were bargaining for a “package of goods and services” rather than a property 
interest in land.34  Thus the case, while a staple of property law courses, could 
also be used in contract law courses to examine the concept of implied promise 
and the relationships created by buyers and sellers of goods and services. 
Because of the transactional nature of landlord and tenant relationships, 
this topic also provides an excellent opportunity to examine alternative dispute 
resolution techniques and lawyer’s professional responsibility.  A popular 
video, The Red Devil Dog Lease Problem, produced by the Center for Dispute 
Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, introduces 
both mediation and negotiation techniques in a property law setting with a 
landlord-tenant problem.35  That same video can be usefully shown in a 
 
 31. See, e.g., Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes 
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of 
American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982); Roger A. Cunningham, The New 
Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 
16. URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979). 
 32. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 33. Id. at 1075.  Courts have sought to “protect the legitimate expectations of the buyer and 
have steadily widened the seller’s responsibility for quality of goods and services through implied 
warranties of fitness and merchant ability.”  Id. 
 34. Id. at 1074. 
 35. Dale A. Whitman, The Missing Tenant: A Negotiation Exercise for Property Law, in 
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, INSTRUCTOR’S MANUAL WITH SIMULATION AND 
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contracts course.  In the property law course, I have used the materials in two 
ways.  First, students are divided into teams and given the basic facts of the 
Red Devil Dog Lease Problem and are asked to negotiate an agreement 
between a commercial landlord who had previously entered a lease with a 
young woman who wanted to open a franchise restaurant and the young 
woman who had signed the lease and now wants to get out of it because the 
franchiser who was going to help finance her venture has declared bankruptcy.  
The students are then asked to turn in a memo indicating the details of their 
agreement or reasons why they were unable to agree.  After the students have 
completed this exercise, they watch the videotape showing a mediation of this 
problem.  If time does not allow for the mock negotiation exercise, showing 
the video is useful in its own right. 
A second negotiation exercise that my colleague Professor Alan 
Weinberger and I have used in our Real Estate Transactions course is a 
contract negotiation problem involving the purchase and sale of a house.  This 
problem is based on problem 2 in Paul Goldstein’s and Gerald Korngold’s 
Real Estate Transactions: Statute, Form and Problem Supplement.36  We 
divide students into teams and ask them to negotiate the basic elements of a 
contract.  Again, they submit either a signed agreement or a signed 
memorandum indicating why they were unable to reach an agreement.  There 
is no reason why these problems cannot be used in the first-year contract law 
course to raise the same points about negotiation, mediation and the 
importance of a lawyer’s sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of all parties. 
In introducing students to these negotiation and mediation problems, I am 
helped immeasurably by an article written by the late Professor Curtis Berger, 
Hard Leases Make Bad Law,37 and by a series of articles by an experienced 
real estate practitioner, Emanuel Halper: Can You Find A Fair Lease?,38 Magic 
Words39 and Lawyers Doing Battle.40  Professor Berger’s article was based on 
 
PROBLEM MATERIALS TO ACCOMPANY DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 200-14 (1987), 
and an accompanying videotape now reprinted in part 4A, INSTRUCTORS MANUAL FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION ON LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997).  Professor Nancy Rodgers of Ohio State University 
prepared simulation materials based upon the videotape The Red Devil Dog Lease Mediation, part 
4B, INSTRUCTORS MANUAL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION ON LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997). 
 36. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KORNGOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: STATUTE, 
FORM AND PROBLEM SUPPLEMENT 262-64 (Rev. 3d ed. 1997).  I also used this problem for a 
negotiation exercise in my first-year Real Property II section while a visitor at Pepperdine Law 
School during the spring semester, 2000. 
 37. Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1974). 
 38. Emanuel B. Halper, Can You Find a Fair Lease?, 14 REAL EST. L. J. 99 (1985) 
(hereinafter Can You Find a Fair Lease?). 
 39. Emanuel B. Halper, Magic Words, 27 REAL EST. REV. 86 (1997) (hereinafter Magic 
Words). 
 40. Emanuel B. Halper, Lawyers Doing Battle, 27 REAL EST. REV. 62 (1998) (hereinafter 
Lawyers Doing Battle). 
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a study of 103 reported landlord-tenant cases in New York courts from 1970 to 
1972, about evenly divided between commercial and residential tenancies and 
involving standard form printed leases heavily stacked in favor of the 
landlord.41  He wrote that he was not surprised to find that judges were 
reluctant to give landlords what they asked for and, in most cases, literally 
deserved.  In concluding his study, he posed a question concerning what he 
calls the issue of “contract integrity”—the integrity of the paper that seals the 
bargain.  “Here I use ‘integrity’ in a dual sense.  I refer both to the honesty or 
fairness of the contract and to its even-handed completeness.”42  He 
distinguished between contract integrity and contract unconscionability, 
arguing that they occupied the “opposing ends of the spectrum.”  The doctrine 
of unconscionability, which we study in the first semester of contracts law, 
represents to him “a doctrine of last resort,” thus “virtually any contract that 
does not shock the conscience is presumptably valid.”  He then concludes by 
suggesting that the legal system “should espouse a higher norm . . . .  Each 
party who signs an agreement should sense its truth and essential fairness and 
should believe that the paper fully states his rights and remedies, that it 
captures both parties’ understanding, that it conceals no hookers, and that it is 
understandable.”43 
Manny Halper writes from the perspective of over forty years of practice 
of real estate law in and around the New York metropolitan area.  He primarily 
argues that lawyers who negotiate and draft real estate contracts should 
emphasize and strive for a fair agreement.  While admitting that he has drafted 
one-sided leases, he stresses that “[t]he main advantage of drafting a fair lease 
is that you might get it signed.”44  He also argues that “[r]eal estate documents 
are much too hard to read”45 and recommends that lawyers should pay more 
attention to “writing understandable documents.”46  Finally, he advocates that 
lawyers attempt to “change the atmosphere.”47 
When I read the first draft of a contract, mortgage, or lease that someone sends 
to my client, I usually get the feeling that the drafter hates us.  Hates, not 
abstractly, but deeply, really, vituperatively.  I often read leases prepared by a 
landlord’s lawyer.  As I wade through its turgid prose down to the last run-on 
sentence, I sometimes wonder whether my client (the tenant) really has the 
right to occupy the premises . . . .  When my client is the landlord, reviewing a 
 
 41. Berger, supra note 37, at 792. 
 42. Id. at 814. 
 43. Id. at 815.  See also Peter Siviglia, Teaching the Drafting of Contracts, 70-Jun. N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 46, 47, 49 (1998) (“Contracts . . . are about relationships: . . . There is no shame in drafting a 
fair agreement.”). 
 44. Can You Find a Fair Lease?, supra note 38, at 121. 
 45. Magic Words, supra note 39, at 86. 
 46. Id. at 87. 
 47. Id. 
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form lease prepared by a powerful tenant can also leave me incredulous.  Some 
tenant form leases provide for so many opportunities to withhold rent 
payments that I wonder whether the tenant is really willing to pay any rent at 
all . . . .  Since most lawyers don’t litigate, and they spend most of their lives 
negotiating, it would seem a particularly good idea for them to discard old 
notions and to rethink their role in society.  They are professional 
negotiators . . . .48 
These readings and this discussion also can be added to the contract law 
course to emphasize the importance of good planning and good drafting in 
both the contracts and property areas. 
C. Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
I also use Pigg v. Haley to explore the lawyer’s responsibility to develop a 
rapport with a client, to understand fully the underlying concerns that a client 
may have, and to be loyal to that client while serving the public interest.  For 
example, we ask whether Mrs. Haley understood what she was giving up when 
she accepted the agreement the lawyer had dictated.  It is hard to believe that 
she did understand because within twenty months she acted as though she 
owned a fee simple interest in the property.  Also, did the lawyer discover 
perhaps the underlying problem—Mrs. Haley’s disappointment at her 
husband’s apparent lack of confidence in her management abilities? 
The importance of these questions was dramatized to me several years ago.  
I was a moderator of a panel discussion on New Developments in property law 
at a meeting of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the 
American Bar Association.  One of the speakers, who was reviewing cases on 
the estates and trust side, focused on the rules of professional responsibility 
and the importance of ascertaining whether a married couple engaged in estate 
planning are in agreement on the plan.  He was asked a question based on the 
following incident.  The questioner had helped a couple negotiate an estate 
plan because they were leaving on a cruise.  They spent a considerable amount 
of time over several days working on drafts and discussing them.  Finally the 
couple agreed on a particular draft and the attorney had the couple come down 
to his office to sign the documents.  The attorney said he liked to offer a glass 
of champagne after a couple had signed their papers.  In this case, when the 
papers were signed and the attorney moved to pick up the champagne glasses, 
one of the clients picked up the papers, tore them up and stormed out the door.  
When the story was told, the speaker’s response was: “You are the third person 
who has told me they experienced that particular problem.” 
I thought about Pigg v. Haley when I heard that discussion.  The contracts 
aspect of these kinds of cases offer beautiful illustrations to first-year law 
students of how complicated the personal dynamics of a transaction can be.  It 
 
 48. Lawyers Doing Battle, supra note 40, at 62-64. 
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also demonstrates the importance for a lawyer to be sensitive to the personal 
dynamics and to develop techniques for creating a relationship with a client 
that produces the necessary trust and confidence for effective collaboration.  In 
Pigg v. Haley, the lawyer, I believe, was surprised by the fact that the 
agreement broke down.  Mrs. Haley had been surprised by her husband’s will 
and had not been able to respond effectively to it.  Then, she was surprised to 
find out that she did not have what she thought she had. 
This case also could be an excellent addition to the contract law course 
because the court had to decide what the meaning of the agreement was in 
order to decide who owned what property interest.  Thus, questions of clarity 
in drafting, as well as the transactional aspect of the process, can be 
highlighted.  The contract law doctrine of consideration was applied to the 
court’s construction of the agreement to determine its enforceability. 
D. Lawyers’ Multiple Roles 
Observations by experienced academicians and practitioners noted above49 
give me an opportunity in the first-year courses to introduce law students to the 
reality that most of the time they will be engaged in negotiations—and the 
number of times they appear in court as a result of those negotiations will be 
relatively small unless, of course, they opt for careers in either criminal or tort 
law.50  Our teaching materials are extraordinarily rich and efficient because our 
tradition of reported appellate opinions offers a gold mine of materials.  Our 
use of the broad “Socratic” case method of instruction, i.e., “both an 
unwillingness to take the soundness of any judicial opinion for granted . . . and 
a commitment to place the conflicting positions that each lawsuit presents in 
their most attractive light,”51 is an extraordinarily efficient way to expose 
students to broad legal principles and the adversarial method of dispute 
resolution. 
Unfortunately, as has been noted in a variety of studies of the law school 
experience,52 these same materials may create a false impression in the minds 
 
 49. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text. 
 50. I recall my disappointment at a comment made during a conversation on the first day I 
reported for work with a large private law firm in St. Louis in the summer of 1967.  As was the 
custom of the firm, two senior lawyers took me to lunch at a high-class local restaurant.  During 
the course of the conversation, the two lawyers (both of whom specialized in real estate practice) 
began talking about how they approached their practice.  One of them commented matter-of-
factly that if he had to go to court he felt like he had failed his client.  The other partner agreed, 
saying that the last thing in the world he wanted to do was wind up in court.  I remember thinking 
to myself, “What have I been doing for the last several years in law school?”  We studied reported 
cases from appellate courts, and I had the impression that’s what lawyers did—they went to court. 
 51. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 110 (1993). 
 52. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, 
(1996) REPORT AND SYMPOSIUM (1997); LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
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of inexperienced law students.  They may conclude that the lawyer’s main role 
is to litigate and that litigation is the favorite means of resolving disputes 
peacefully.53  This impression may begin to take hold when we introduce new 
students to our jury system by comparing it to the medieval “trial by battle” or 
“trial by ordeal,” or by describing it as an alternative to “the gunfight at the 
O.K. Corral” or the “shoot out at high noon.”  Even the term “alternative 
dispute resolution” can contribute to this notion.54 
One way to dispel this notion is to introduce students early to the variety of 
roles that lawyers play.  Property and contract law courses both lend 
themselves very well to this because of the transactional nature of much of 
property and contractual law practice.  In their book, Lawyers, Clients, and 
Moral Responsibility,55 Professors Tom Shaffer and Bob Cochran identify four 
roles that lawyers play and four corresponding approaches to moral choices 
concerning the question “whether the lawyer and client should take actions that 
will work to the disadvantage of other people.”56 
(1) The lawyer as godfather, in which the lawyer is in control and the goal 
is a victory for the client; 
(2) The lawyer as hired gun, in which the client is in control and client 
autonomy is the goal; 
(3) The lawyer as guru, in which the lawyer is in control and the goal is 
client rectitude, and 
(4) The lawyer as friend, in which the emphasis is on collaborative 
discourse between the lawyer and the client and the goal is client 
goodness, or more specifically, achieving a good result.57 
 
DEVELOPMENT―AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) and CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
(1994). 
 53. Of course, litigation is peaceful only in the physical sense.  It can be extremely violent in 
an emotional or psychological sense. 
 54. I attended a conference on ADR a number of years ago at which a speaker commented 
wryly that from the rest of the world’s perspective, litigation is the “alternative” technique.  
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow notes that advocates of ADR now refer to conciliatory 
techniques as Appropriate Dispute Resolution.  She argues that lawyers should shift their frame 
of reference from advocate/adversary to creative problem-solvers and peacemakers who seek 
“Pareto-optional solutions . . . the best possible solution for each party without harming the other 
side.” Menkel-Meadow, supra note 26, at 791-92, 802. 
 55. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1994). 
 56. Id. at 3. 
 57. Id. at 5-54.  An alternative categorization of lawyers—”trickster,” “hero” and “helper”—
is found in Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the 
Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177.  Professor Scott Burnham suggests giving 
students such “paradigms of lawyer types” and asking students “how each would resolve specific 
problems.”  Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 105, 107 
(1991) (citing Mindes & Acock). 
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In their discussion of the lawyer as friend, Professors Shaffer and Cochran 
use the term “friend” in the Aristotelian sense of a collaborator in doing 
good.58  They argue that this understanding of friend differs in “important 
aspects from the way that people commonly understand friendship today.”59  
They quote Robert Bellah on the difference between the traditional and modern 
understandings of friendship: 
[T]he traditional idea of friendship had three essential components.  Friends 
must enjoy one another’s company, they must be useful to one another, and 
they must share a common commitment to the good.  Today we tend to define 
friendship most in terms of the first component: friends are those we take 
pleasure in being with.60 
Professors Shaffer and Cochran argue that lawyers “should be concerned 
primarily with the third and most neglected aspect, the moral aspect of the 
relationship between friends . . . .”61 
This question of the appropriate role that lawyers should play can and 
should be introduced in the first year.  It can be introduced profitably in both 
the property and the contract law courses because in both there is a wide 
variety of settings in which people come to lawyers in order to enter into 
transactions with other people.  Both Pigg v. Haley, discussed earlier,62 and 
Stare v. Tate,63 are good examples of these opportunities.  In Stare, a case that 
usually is located in contract law casebooks under the heading of 
“Misunderstanding and Mistake,” the former wife sought to reform a property 
settlement agreement because of a mistake in computation made by the former 
wife’s attorney when drafting the settlement proposal.  The mistake in 
computation was about $70,000, and that mistake gave the husband essentially 
what he had been arguing for throughout the protracted negotiations.  The 
husband’s accountant discovered the mistake while helping the husband’s 
attorney prepare a counteroffer.  The accountant brought it to the attention of 
the attorney, who did not call the mistake to the attention of his client or the 
wife’s attorney, but instead decided to accept the mistaken proposal because 
the result was approximately what the husband had been seeking.  The mistake 
did not come to light until after the property settlement agreement had been 
signed.  When the former husband learned of the mistake, he could not resist 
getting the “exquisite last word.”  After he found out about the mistake he 
 
 58. Id. at 45 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 8 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)). 
 59. Id. at 45. 
 60. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 55, at 45 (quoting ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., 
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 115 (1985)). 
 61. Id. at 45-46. 
 62. See generally supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
 63. 98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).  Professor Scott Burnham features Stare v. Tate 
in his extremely helpful article on adding ethics issues in the contracts course.  See Burnham, 
supra note 57, at 114. 
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mailed his former wife a copy of the offer that contained the mistake in 
computation.  On top of the page he wrote: “PLEASE NOTE THE $100,000 
MISTAKE IN YOUR FIGURES.”  The former wife filed a lawsuit one month 
later seeking reformation.  She lost at the trial court but won at the appellate 
court level.64 
In addition to being a useful mechanism for examining the circumstances 
in which courts will intervene to enable parties to correct mistakes in signed 
agreements, the case is an extremely valuable illustration of professional 
responsibility issues and an interesting commentary on human nature.  What 
should the attorney for the husband have done when he discovered the mistake 
in computation?  What role did he play in taking the action that he took?  Was 
it the appropriate role?  Could he have served his client better in the long run 
by taking a different attitude about the mistake?  These are questions that can 
and should be posed to first-year law students.  They enrich the course because 
they move beyond the technician level of learning the rules of law, and 
introduce students to the concept of the reflective practitioner.65 
The reflective practitioner is distinguished from the (legal) expert in a 
variety of ways, including less interest in client deference and greater interest 
in collaborating with the client in problem solving.66  The reflective 
practitioner focuses on solving problems in “indeterminate” situations made so 
“because the facts are ambiguous or hard to ascertain, because the client is 
confused or ambivalent, or because the law is unclear, [o]r the situation . . . is 
unique.”67  Such a professional “reflects in action.”  This reflective 
conversation with the situation “takes place in the midst of action, . . . and it 
need not employ the medium of words . . . . The term conversation is, in this 
usage, metaphorical.  It does not refer to a literal conversation about the 
 
 64. Id. at 433-37. 
 65. The term “reflective practitioner” was used by the late Donald A. Schon, a former 
professor at MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, in seminal studies across the 
professions.  DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK 
IN ACTION (1983) and EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN 
FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987).  For a discussion of Schon’s work, 
see Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative 
Failures of Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 401 (2000). 
 66. See Neumann, supra note 65, at 411-12 (citing SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE 
PRACTITIONER, supra note 65, at 290-307).  Professor Neumann also cites an interesting study of 
personal injury cases in which the attorney-client relationship was categorized as either 
“traditionally hierarchical (the lawyer as an authority figure) or participatory (lawyer and client 
working together to solve problems).”  Id. at 411 n.57; see generally DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, 
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974).  On average, participatory relationships 
achieved slightly better results.  Neumann, supra note 65, at 411 n.58. 
 67. See Neumann, supra note 65, at 405-06 (citing SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE 
PRACTITIONER, supra note 65, at 12). 
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situation, but to an inquirer’s conversation-like transaction with the materials at 
hand.”68 
The lawyer-client relationship is a complex personal relationship.  The 
lawyer must establish a rapport with her client that enables the client to have 
trust and confidence in the lawyer.  But the lawyer is also licensed by the state 
to serve the public interest.  Dean Anthony Kronman describes the lawyer ideal 
as one who has the ability to respond to clients with both “sympathy and 
detachment,” and who possesses the virtues of “prudence and public-
spiritedness.”69  Stare v. Tate is an excellent vehicle for introducing first-year 
students to the complexities of that ideal while engaging in the very human act 
of developing trust and confidence, and understanding what it means to be not 
only a loyal advocate for one’s client, but also a public servant participating in 
the legal process. 
E. Drafting Documents 
The contract law course also offers an opportunity to introduce students to 
an important form of legal writing—drafting documents.  When drafting 
documents, lawyers are functioning as planners—professionals who are 
endeavoring to help their clients complete transactions.  Contracts, loans, 
property transfers, estate plans and settlement agreements are examples of 
transactions in which documents are used to define relationships and 
memorialize expectations of the parties.  We spend a lot of time in the contract 
law course talking about how important it is that a promise be definite, that it 
be complete, that it provide a source of remedy for breach and that it provide a 
vehicle for modifying or altering terms if so desired.  Most of our teaching 
materials present these concepts in the format of an after-the-fact dissection of 
an agreement that was not drafted properly.  The Langdellian case method that 
has dominated the first year of law school for well over a century has enabled 
law schools to maintain the tradition of large first-year classes, although many 
schools now offer first-year students at least one small section.  The large 
section tradition has made it extremely difficult for law professors to engage in 
the time consuming process of reading and commenting on eighty to one 
hundred documents several times a semester.70 
 
 68. See Neumann, supra note 65, at 406 (quoting Donald A. Schon, The Theory of Inquiry: 
Dewey’s Legacy to Education, 22 CURRICULUM INQUIRY 119, 125 (1992)). 
 69. KRONMAN, supra note 51, at 131-33, 154-55. 
 70. I once taught a civil procedure course in a drafting mode to a group of ninety first-year 
students.  It was team-taught with the director of the clinical program.  Students were asked to 
draft litigation documents based on the facts in a hypothetical problem.  They began by watching 
a video of a client interview.  From that they drafted a memorandum to the file indicating what 
they thought the important facts were, what they thought the legal issues were, and what they 
proposed to do.  Following that they were asked to draft a complaint and an answer to another 
student’s complaint.  They also drafted motions to make more definite and certain, motions to 
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Fortunately, Professor Scott Burnham has provided an excellent book, 
Drafting Contracts, now in its second edition.71  This slim paperback book of 
just over 300 pages is designed to be used in conjunction with any of the 
popular contract law books.  It offers a series of exercises and commentaries 
on the drafting of contracts, or as Professor Burnham puts it in his subtitle, A 
Guide to the Practical Application of Principals of Contract Law.72  Professor 
Burnham has a pragmatic and, upon second thought, a logical suggestion—one 
of these “why didn’t I think of that earlier?” suggestions.  He doesn’t read the 
drafts that students prepare.  He likens them to briefs: we all recommend that 
students brief cases, but we do not collect and read the briefs.  He then 
discusses specific drafting problems using overheads or Powerpoint 
presentations to engage the students in drafting by showing them a proposed 
draft and then asking for their reactions, suggestions, additions or deletions.  
Because I am new to the course this time around, I am recommending that 
students acquire this book for the first semester; and I am requiring it in the 
second semester and will assign several drafting exercises during the second 
semester. 
CONCLUSION 
While I have had a wonderful time in the property law classroom over the 
past quarter century, contract law remains, in many respects, my first love in 
teaching.  I enjoy the opportunity to engage students in an examination of the 
legal, as well as moral and philosophical, underpinnings of the promise 
concept.  The personal and business relationships that are the foundation of a 
free market economy and democratic society are protected by the basic 
principles of modern contract law: bargain, commitment, exchange, honesty 
and fair dealing, and voluntary participation. 
Contract and property law are closely connected.  Many property interests 
are created by contracts, while other contracts are entered into to protect 
property interests.  Friedman emphasizes this point in The Lexus and the Olive 
Tree,73 for contract and property law are transaction-oriented and require 
 
dismiss, a set of interrogatories, and a deposition plan.  We read and critiqued the papers weekly.  
At the end of the course my colleague and I agreed that it was a wonderful experience, but we 
both were too exhausted to consider trying it again with so many students. 
  Respondents to a 1993 survey of practitioners in Chicago and in Missouri noted 
significant gaps between what practitioners considered to be important skills and what they 
believed law schools taught effectively.  The largest gap was in drafting legal documents: 80% 
believed this to be an important skill, but only 24% believed it had been taught effectively.  
Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching Lawyering to First-Year Students: An Experiment in Constructing 
Legal Competence, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1651-53 (1995). 
 71. SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1993). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12. 
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lawyers who are counselors, planners and negotiators.  My interest in, and 
emphasis on, alternative dispute resolution techniques, drafting ethics and 
professional responsibility are based on this reality. 
Finally, contracts law perhaps more than other traditional first-year 
courses, offers a “modified Socratic” instructor, as I think of myself, the 
opportunity to join with students in a dialogue about how to resolve problems 
peacefully.  This is an exciting but sobering venture.  Helping people solve 
problems peacefully is the lawyers’ highest calling. 
 
